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Terdapat harapan yang tinggi terhadap pemerintah yang baru saat Gus Dur dipilih 
menjadi presiden oleh Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) pada tahun 1999 un-
tuk mendorong reformasi tata kelola dan inisiatif anti-korupsi yang lebih signifikan, 
mengingat Presiden Gus Dur dan Wakil Presiden Megawati merupakan tokoh utama 
oposisi di era Orde Baru masa Presiden Soeharto. Tulisan ini mencoba melakukan eva-
luasi dari berbagai inisiatif reformasi tata kelola dan anti-korupsi yang dilakukan oleh 
pemerintah Indonesia pada tahun 1999–2001. Argumen yang tertera dalam artikel ini 
adalah terdapat sebuah kesempatan untuk mendorong inisiatif yang lebih progresif 
dalam hal reformasi tata kelola dan inisiatif anti-korupsi, di mana terdapat pemimpin 
politik yang mendapat dukungan rakyat yang kuat melalui proses pemilihan umum 
yang jujur dan adil dengan diangkatnya Gus Dur dan Megawati Soekarnoputri sebagai 
Presden dan Wakil Presiden oleh Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR). Namun kare-
na persaingan politik yang begitu keras di antara para elite politik untuk memperoleh 
aset negara demi kepentingan kampanye politik 2004, membuat kemunduran dalam 
beberapa area terkait reformasi tata kelola seperti reformasi yudisial.
Kata kunci: reformasi tata kelola, anti-korupsi, politik Indonesia, presiden Indonesia
ABSTRACT
There were high hopes that Gus Dur, after being appointed by the People Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) in 1999, would bring significant governance reform and more pro-
gressive anti-corruption measures for the first time because two top leaders (Gus Dur 
and Megawati) were from the opposition in the New Order era. This paper attempts 
to evaluate the governance reform and anti-corruption measures in 1999–2001. This 
paper argues that there was a valuable opportunity to push for further governance 
reforms and a bolder anti-corruption drive, as there was a legitimate political top lea-
dership stemming from the free-and-fair election in 1999 embodied in the appointment 
of Gus Dur and Megawati Soekarnoputri as president and vice president, respectively, 
by the Consultative People Assembly (MPR). However, the political bickering and bla-
tant competition over state resources for the election campaign in 2004 underlying 
Indonesia’s former government led to a setback in several governance reform areas, 
including judicial reform.
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After the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesia became a volatile 
political environment where subsequent post-Soeharto presidents had 
to deal with demands from an empowered civil society and the mass 
media for a more democratic political governance structure while over-
see the economic recovery from the ruins of the major Indonesian 
economic crisis in 1997–1998.  President Habibie accomplished several 
achievements by opening up the press, ensure freedom of information 
and facilitating the first relative free-and-fair democratic legislative in 
1999 (Anwar 2010), but he still lost the election because he failed to 
address corruption in the New Order era (Liddle 1999, 37). There was a 
high hope that the Abdurrahman Wahid (otherwise known as Gus Dur) 
presidency after being appointed by the People Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) in 1999 would bring significant governance reform and more 
progressive anti-corruption measures for the first time, because two top 
leaders (Gus Dur and Megawati) were coming from the opposition in 
the New Order era (King 2000, 621). However, both also found it was 
challenging to fight against corruption within their time on power.
The explanation of the failure to fight corruption has brought to 
two opposite explanations. The first argument says that it is the actors 
who are responsible for the failure as they are not doing enough or even 
part of the corruption itself which can be traced to the discussion by 
several researchers (Groenendijk 1997). This argument is challenged by 
the other who underline that corruption has become widespread due to 
collective acceptance toward the practice, including by part of citizens 
(Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). Indonesia with the experience 
of an attempt to reform its political regime and stem corruption since 
1998 can be a good example to investigate this debate.  
With that background, this paper attempts to evaluate Indonesia’s 
government in 1999–2001 in the context of governance reform and 
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anti-corruption measures and finds an explanation of its failure to stem 
corruption. Focusing on this period is important because it marked the 
beginning of a solid foundation for sustainable governance reform and 
anti-corruption due to the high legitimacy of the new President and 
Vice President as well as their detachment with previous New Order 
regime and high expectation of pushing for reform.
This paper argues that the political bickering and blatant competi-
tion over state resources for the election campaign in 2004 that bedev-
iled the Indonesia Government in 1999–2001 led to a setback in several 
governance reform areas –including anti-corruption measure. At some 
point, this argument is related to the principals-agents theory that actors 
are the main source of corruptive behavior. However, instead of focus-
ing on the behavior of the agents, the case of Indonesia in 1999–2001 
shows that failure of fighting corruption is on the principals or those 
who are in power. The political elites are not in the same bracket of 
executing reform agenda due to the ineffective leadership as well as the 
withdrawal and challenge of political support among the elites.
LITER ATUR E R EV IEW A ND 
THEOR ETICA L FR A MEWOR K
The current literature on Gus Dur does not cover specifically the as-
pect of governance reform and anti-corruption. Barton (2002) provides 
an excellent biography that fiercely defended Gus Dur legacy, which 
lacked critical examination on corruption during his administration. 
By contrast, a wide body of literature focused on Gus Dur’s noble role 
in advancing pluralism through his leadership in Indonesia’s largest 
Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (Barton and Fealy 1996; Ram-
age 1997; Hefner 2000). Other studies attempted to assess Gus Dur’s 
government on economy policy (Reid 2003) and political, military, and 
social policy (Budiman 2001; Budiman and Kingsbury 2003). However, 
these studies did not focus on governance reform and anti-corruption 
issues in that era. Instead, other work on anti-corruption effort in Indo-
nesia focused on Soekarno’s Guided Democracy Era (Juwono 2017a), 
Soeharto era (Juwono 2017b), or post-Soeharto era (Dick 2006; Jacobs 
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and Wagner 2007; Butt 2011; 2016; Dick and Mullholand 2016). In my 
view, Indonesia’s government during the Gus Dur era should be exam-
ined thoroughly as its governance reform and anti-corruption measure 
provide valuable lessons for progressive forces within or outside the 
government in the subsequent era to establish a powerful Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2002. The period of 1999–2001 was 
an important milestone because of the hope that both Gus Dur and 
Megawati as President and Vice President would bring a significant 
change in governance and address corruption. This expectation was 
rooted in the fact that both leaders were known as prominent opposi-
tion figures in the New Order era. Thus, the setback would impact the 
trajectory that made the democratic consolidation not an optimal solu-
tion in the post-Soeharto era. This article highlights the argument that 
the failure in embarking significant governance reform and addressing 
corruption started from the beginning of the post-Soeharto era.
The Debates’ Political Landscape 
in the Post-Soeharto Era
Several streams of literature have interpreted the new political gover-
nance structure after the fall of Soeharto from the presidency in May 
1998. One of the most widely cited factors in interpreting the change 
in the political governance structure during the post-Soeharto era is the 
dominant political role played by the oligarchy with their narrow inter-
est at the expense of public interest (Robison and Hadiz 2004). These 
oligarchs comprise conglomerates (mostly Indonesian Chinese), politi-
cal businessmen (indigenous businessmen) and state officials. Hadiz 
and Robison argued that the political democratic governance structure 
in the post-Soeharto era still served the interests of the oligarchy, given 
their wealth preservation agenda (Hadiz and Robison 2014). Other 
academics employed the analytical framework developed by Robison 
and Hadiz but with a different nuance, such as in the analysis of In-
donesian Chinese conglomerates by Chua (2007) or the link between 
human rights issues and the role of the politico-business group (Rosser 
2013). Within the same stream of oligarchy thought, Jeffrey Winters 
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emphasized that oligarchs are disproportionally influential actors within 
Indonesia’s political economy structure who rose during the New Order 
era and survived in the post-Soeharto era (Winters 2011, 16). Neverthe-
less, both Hadiz and Winters agreed that the progressive forces such as 
civil society is an ill match to oligarchy in terms of political influence 
(Hadiz 2004, 50; Winters 2014, 22).
The other analytical framework focuses on the form of political 
dealings behind the scene that facilitated the distribution of patronage 
through power-sharing by a political party leader through the forma-
tion of a cartel.  This stream of thought was applied in Indonesia’s 
post-Soeharto era (2001–2004) by Slater (2004) and later by Ambardi 
(2008; 2009).  Thus, this cartel arrangement manipulated the Indone-
sian political governance structure for the sake of their political party’s 
self-interest through a quid pro quo arrangement, which was possible 
in the post-Soeharto era because both the president and vice president 
were still selected by the MPR. The cabinet formed by Gus Dur in 
1999 reflected the compromise made by the political parties within the 
cartel. Once Gus Dur abandoned this agreement, the cartel through 
the MPR, arranged impeachment proceedings and promoted Megawati 
Sukarnoputri to the presidency. In ensuring political support, Megawati 
established a “rainbow” cabinet that accommodated almost every po-
litical party in parliament, except for Gus Dur’s PKB. This “collusive 
arrangement,” as Dan Slater termed it, provided political stability in 
2001–2004 because they did not think that anyone could challenge 
them in accessing the financial spoils (Slater 2006, 210). As a result, 
cartel theorists concluded that the political party elites extracted state 
resources through a power-sharing arrangement and protected them 
from electoral accountability.  
The third stream of thought is political pluralism, which Mietzner 
(2015, 3) called the “pluralist camp”, Fukuoka (2014) coined the “liber-
alist” camp, and Pepinsky (2014) termed “pluralism.” The proponents 
of political pluralism argue that, in the post-Soeharto era, the political 
governance structure facilitated ceaseless fierce competition between 
the reformist and predatory elements.  According to Aspinall, even the 
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lower-class group (e.g., laborers and farmers) were able to take advantage 
of the political space provided by the new democratic governance struc-
ture in the post-Soeharto era by advancing its interests and forcing the 
oligarchy to compromise (Aspinall 2014, 135). While Aspinall outlined 
the existence of a grassroots movement against the dominance of the 
oligarchy, Lane emphasized the role of students in toppling Soeharto 
and the growing mass-protests that expanded not only in the capital but 
throughout several regions (Lane 2008, 271–8). Meanwhile, the infu-
sion of civil society into the formal political institutions’ structure such 
as MPs, advisers, or even ministers would bring about more concrete 
change (Mietzner 2013, 28–50).
In my view, political pluralism is a sufficient theory that captures 
the political dynamic in Indonesia.  The oligarchs were certainly one 
of the important actors in the political contestation. However, the po-
litical actors unpredictably change alliances in their political battles to 
achieve the governance reform agenda, therefore neither the oligarchs 
nor cartel theorists, in my view, sufficiently capture this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the democratic governance struc-
ture of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto period, particularly until 2004, was 
fully consolidated. The continued practices of corruption, collusion 
and nepotism (KKN) remained prevalent during the post-Soeharto era 
providing a significant challenge for progressive political actors in push-
ing governance reform and anti-corruption effort (Dick 2006; Jacobs 
and Wagner 2007; Butt 2011; Dick and Mullholand 2016). Therefore, 
the theoretical framework of political pluralism is applied in this article 
because it can identify the political struggle between the progressive 
and conservative political elite in the context of pushing governance 
reform and addressing corruption in this important political milestone. 
This crucial milestone was in the period 1999–2001 when this was the 
biggest opportunity to lay the foundation of democratic governance and 
create a momentum for sustainable anti-corruption effort. The politi-
cal elites supposedly originated from the opposition group in the New 
Order era, and they were led by Gus Dur and Megawati Soekarnoputri. 
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However, perhaps it is worth to look at the debate on why anti-
corruption fails in many developing countries. The underlining idea 
that the problem of corruption in Indonesia is to some extent caused 
by elites’ competition offers hindsight of the locus of the failure within 
principals-agents argument. This has become an alternative explana-
tion on the agency theory that agents including political elites and bu-
reaucrats are the source of the practice. In the eyes of principals-agents 
theory, one of the most referred theory, the source of corruptive behav-
ior is the bad attitude of the agents that betrayed principals’ contract for 
their benefit (Groenendijk 1997). Nevertheless, the case of Indonesia 
as shown in this paper shows that the problems of corruption in Indo-
nesia after the emergence of outsider politicians from previous regimes 
is due to the elites’ themselves. Thus, it is not solely the problem of 
bureaucracy that betrays the principals but there is a dimension the 
breakdown of the principals too. To some extent, this has reminded us 
of the arguments of collective acceptance of corruptive practice among 
the citizens as offered by Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013). There 
is a dimension of collective approval of the corruptive behavior. But, 
before looking at the widespread acceptance among the society, it is 
the elites’ collective dimension that plays apart too. Instead of having 
the same collective position to execute the reform agenda, the political 
elites are not in the mood of building the same agenda in this matter.
METHODOLOGY A ND DATA
In achieving its research objectives, descriptive analysis was utilized to 
describe the political dynamics of Indonesia in the context of gover-
nance reform and anti-corruption in the period of 2000–2001, as well 
as identify political actors and their role in either pushing or stalling the 
reform. The primary data for the research were from semi-structured 
interviews to around 30 resource persons. To ensure a comprehensive 
perspective, the resource persons represented quite a diverse group, in-
cluding former Vice Chairman of Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) Chandra Hamzah, Chief Editor of Tempo Magazine Arif Zulki-
fli, and Former Indonesia Corruption Watch’s Coordinator Danang 
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Widoyoko. Furthermore, numerous laws and regulations on governance 
reform and anti-corruption were also analyzed as primary data.
To complement the primary resource data, this article conducted a 
document study for secondary resource data. This document included 
articles from leading international academic journals on democracy and 
politics, especially those that focused on East Asia and Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, many academic books from leading academic publishers 
from leading scholars on Indonesia politics were used for this document 
study. Finally, the articles published by Indonesia’s leading mass me-
dia group (whether print newspaper, weekly magazine, or online news) 
were also analyzed in the document studies. The included articles were 
published from Kompas, Tempo, and the Jakarta Post.
DISCUSSION A ND A NA LYSIS
The presentation of research results and its discussion will be structured 
in four sections. The first section will discuss the literature debate on 
the political landscape during post-Soeharto. As in the second section, 
it outlines the anti-corruption drive by President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
followed by his handling of Soeharto’s family’s corruption cases in the 
third section. His unsuccessful addressing of judicial reform is described 
in the fourth section. The conclusion is presented in the fifth section.
The Anti-Corruption Drive in 1999–2001
Following the general election in 1999, Habibie’s accountability speech 
was rejected by the MPR by 355 votes to 322 on October 19, 1999. As 
a result, he announced that he would withdraw from the presidential 
race in October 1999 (Habibie 2006, 428–33).
With Habibie bowing out, Megawati Sukarnoputri became the next 
president frontrunner because PDIP won the national election legis-
lative with more than 33 percent of the votes. However, her political 
miscalculation and the Islamic Parties’ wariness about having a female 
president made Megawati’s presidential campaign dysfunctional and in-
effective. Meanwhile, two leading Islamic leaders, Gus Dur from PKB 
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and Amien Rais from PAN, cleverly exploited Megawati’s presidential 
campaign implosion by forging an Islamic coalition called the middle 
axis or poros tengah, proposing Gus Dur as presidential candidate (Far 
Eastern Economic Review 1999b).
Megawati was stunned and heartbroken at her ultimate defeat in 
the MPR by 313 votes to 373 with crucial support from Golkar that 
catapulted Gus Dur to become the fourth president (Tempo 1999c). 
With pressure from angry grassroots, PDIP supporters participated in 
riots in Jakarta because of their disappointment at Megawati’s loss in the 
presidential race. To restore peace, Gus Dur finally decided to support 
Megawati to become Vice President. In the end, Megawati became 
Vice President by beating Hamzah Haz, who was endorsed by the PPP 
in the MPR by 396 votes to 284 (Tempo 1999b).
With his surprising win in the MPR, Gus Dur had to accommo-
date the political parties who had supported his presidency bid and the 
military in the cabinet, especially as PKB only had 8 percent of the 
seats in the MPR. Therefore, Gus Dur established a “rainbow cabinet,” 
which was underwritten by leading political figures including Amien 
Rais, Wiranto, Megawati, and Akbar Tandjung (Tempo 1999a). Despite 
the compromising nature of Gus Dur’s cabinet, several breakthroughs 
were made, such as the appointment of the first civilian, Juwono Sudar-
sono, to Minister of Defense since 50 years prior; the first Indonesian 
Chinese, Kwik Kian Gie, to the senior post of Coordinating Minister 
of Economic Affairs; and Marzuki Darusman as a credible Attorney 
General (Far Eastern Economic Review 1999a).
However, Gus Dur’s impaired sight due to previous health complica-
tions and his combative leadership style prevented him from managing 
his cabinet as a cohesive team. After only a month in office, in Decem-
ber 1999, Laksamana Sukardi raised an allegation of corruption related 
to Indonesia’s biggest Textile Company, Texmaco, which was owned by 
politically connected Marimutu Sinivasan. Before parliament, Laksa-
mana revealed an array of documents that exposed Texmaco’s mis-
use of “pre-shipment export facilities” and the state-owned bank BNI’s 
breaking of the legal lending limit by giving a disproportionate loan to 
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Texmaco. In early December 1999, the Attorney General Office (AGO) 
announced that Marimutu was the subject of alleged corruption related 
to the misuse of loans from a number of state-owned banks worth Rp 
9.8 trillion based on Laksamana’s report. Thereafter, AGO’s Marzuki 
launched an investigation by interrogating not only Marimutu but also 
Bank Indonesia Governor Syahril Sabirin and former BI Governor Soe-
drajad Djiwandono (Rulianto 1999).
Laksamana and Marzuki’s efforts in exposing Texmaco’s alleged cor-
ruption did not receive support from Gus Dur. Even the International 
Monetary Fund was disappointed with the lack of progress made by 
threatening to cancel meetings and evaluation meetings unless the 
government liquidated the defunct Sinivasan’s Bank Putera. Eventu-
ally, the AGO halted the investigation on May 2000 because an audit 
conducted by the Financial and Development Audit Agency (BPKP) 
revealed that no state loss was incurred by Texmaco.
Laksamana’s efforts to address corruption finally hit the heart of 
political patronage in Gus Dur’s government as he struggled with 
Minister of Finance Bambang Sudibyo to attain authority in oversee-
ing the lucrative state-owned enterprise banks. Inside the Ministry of 
State-Owned Enterprises, Laksamana was constantly undermined by 
his deputy Rozy Munir, who was very close to Gus Dur (Tempo 2000d). 
According to Greg Barton’s account, PKB and Nahdlatul Ulama mem-
bers were “largely self-serving and greedy and unconcerned about the 
damage that their avaricious behavior was inflicting on NU, PKB, and 
Abdurrahman’s presidency” (Barton 2002, 302–3).
What made matters worse for Laksamana was the fact that Mu-
nir was working together with Megawati’s husband, Taufik Kiemas, 
to distribute the financial spoils. Behind the scenes, Taufik played an 
important role as a powerful political broker. The owner of Texmaco, 
Marimutu Sinivasan, was very close to Taufik; therefore, they were be-
lieved to contribute to Laksamana’s removal from the cabinet (Tempo 
2000d).
Eventually, Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Laksamana Su-
kardi and Minister of Trade and Industry Jusuf Kalla were dismissed 
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from the cabinet on April 29, 2000 on a charge of corruption. Gus Dur 
accused Kalla of collusion involving his company, Bukaka’s, winning 
project of the state-owned electricity company PLN and also Kalla’s 
brother’s involvement in rice imports to BULOG. Both of these allega-
tions were strongly denied by Kalla (Tempo 2000e), while Laksamana 
was accused of appointing a corrupt official to the telecommunications 
company, Indosat (Tempo 2000f). As a further complication, Gus Dur 
replaced Kalla and Laksamana with figures with irrelevant experience 
as Minister of Trade and Industry (Luhut Pandjaitan) and questionable 
integrity. For example, Rozy Munir was promoted to Minister of State-
Owned Enterprises (Tempo 2000a). Gus Dur clearly committed a politi-
cal mistake in sacking both Laksamana and Kalla, thereby exhausting 
his political support from the two biggest parties in parliament, namely, 
PDIP and Golkar (Barton 2002, 303). 
When Gus Dur sacked the two ministers based on an unfounded 
accusation of corruption, his judgment and commitment to addressing 
corruption, collusion and nepotism were questioned. Moreover, the 
mass media and civil society became more hostile because Gus Dur 
was seen using corruption as a pretext for building his own patronage.
The concerns of the mass media and civil society appeared to be 
vindicated when Gus Dur’s reputation and integrity were questioned 
due to the two corruption allegations that emerged known as BULOG 
Gate and Brunei Gate in May–June 2000. As mentioned above, most 
of Gus Dur’s inner circle tried to exploit their closeness to the President 
for their own financial gain, including his masseur, Suwondo. The Vice 
Head of Sapuan embezzled US$4 million from the National Logistic 
Agency’s (BULOG) Foundation and used it to bribe Suwondo to pro-
mote him to the Chair of BULOG, raising questions about whether 
Sapuan could trust Suwondo unless powerful officials were involved 
(Tempo 2000g). Eventually, Secretary of State Bondan Gunawan re-
signed to “shield” the president from this scandal (‘Ring of Scandals’ 
2000).
Another financial scandal emerged in early June 2000 when Gus 
Dur admitted to receiving a donation of around US$2 million from 
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the Sultan of Brunei. According to Gus Dur, he needed the donation 
for humanitarian purposes in Aceh Province in a personal capacity 
(Tempo 2000c), which showed that he failed to consider the conflict 
of interest related to this donation. Within the same period, Gus Dur’s 
brother, Hasyim Wahid, which had been an adviser to Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (a crucial bank restructuring program supported 
by the IMF), admitted that he had helped negotiate the debts of con-
troversial businessmen such as Tommy Soeharto, Prajogo Pangestu, 
and Anthony Salim. This appointment was regarded as nepotism in 
a sector that was crucial in reviving the Indonesian economy and was 
prone to corruption due to the assets that the agency oversaw worth 
billions of US$. This controversy infuriated both the business com-
munity and international donors, forcing Hasyim to voluntarily resign 
from IBRA in June 2000. These allegations toward Gus Dur weakened 
government credibility and its effectiveness especially in dealing with 
big corruption cases.
Negotiation or Prosecution? Handling the 
Soeharto Family’s Corruption Cases
Gus Dur realized that his presidency would be judged on how he dealt 
with Soeharto’s corruption cases, especially as this was mandated by 
MPR decree. From the start of his presidency, Gus Dur signaled that 
he was willing to pardon Soeharto once convicted on condition that 
he would return a significant part of his wealth (Kompas 1999). Gus 
Dur’s premature presumption that Soeharto would be easily convicted 
hampered the investigation.
 After his appointment as Attorney General, Marzuki Darusman 
declared that the prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged corruption was the 
AGO’s highest priority (Media Indonesia 2000). Initially, the Attorney 
General worked swiftly by overturning the SP3 letter and launching 
an investigation into Soeharto’s alleged corruption (Kompas 2000d).
In parallel, Gus Dur also sent Minister of Mining Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono to negotiate with the Soeharto family about the possibility 
of returning a proportion of Soeharto and his family’s wealth. Gus Dur 
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even claimed that Soeharto’s family had agreed to return US$25 billion 
to the state (Tempo 2000b). However, Soeharto’s eldest daughter, Tutut 
Soeharto, insisted that their wealth had been obtained by legal means. 
In the end, Gus Dur’s government called off the negotiation because 
of the “public controversy surrounding the negotiation process.”
Some progress was made in the prosecution of a number of high-
profile corruption cases although the sentences imposed by the courts 
were insufficient. Notably, during the Gus Dur era, Soeharto was inter-
rogated at his home by the AGO for two hours in May 2000 regarding 
his potential misuse of funds in one of his foundations Supersemar. 
However, as a result of the stroke he had suffered, Soeharto was un-
able to answer properly, according to his lawyer (Jakarta Post 2000c). 
Subsequently, Soeharto was formally charged of corruption for allegedly 
misusing his position as Chair of seven foundations, leading to US$416 
million in state losses. The secondary charge against Soeharto was his 
abuse of power while in office, but the South Jakarta court dropped 
this suit after Soeharto failed to attend court due to his illness in Au-
gust–September 2000; examinations of 60 doctors from three different 
teams concluded that Soeharto was mentally and physically unfit to 
stand trial (Jakarta Post 2000a). Perhaps, during the Gus Dur period, 
there was a serious effort to prosecute Soeharto for corruption cases, 
at least compared with the Habibie period. Unfortunately, Soeharto’s 
serious health problems and lack of political support for Gus Dur from 
the political elite to resolve the case stalled the enforcement of the case.
  Meanwhile, Soeharto’s favorite son, Hutomo “Tommy” Man-
dala Putra, was finally convicted of corruption related to a land fraud 
that benefited his company, PT. Goro, and incurred a state loss of Rp 
96.6 billion. Eventually, the MA judge ruled in September 2000 that 
Tommy was to be sentenced to only 18 months in prison and had to 
pay a fine of a mere Rp 10 million (Kompas 2000b). Tommy lobbied 
Gus Dur for clemency where he met Gus Dur privately at Borobudur 
Hotel in Jakarta in October 2000, at which they were speculated to have 
struck a deal (Jakarta Post 2000b).
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However, news came to light that Gus Dur had rejected Tommy’s 
plea for clemency. The AGO issued a warrant for Tommy’s immediate 
arrest and imprisonment, but Tommy was able to escape. Without delay, 
the government declared Tommy a fugitive who was resisting arrest for 
corruption (Jakarta Post 2000e).
Another of Soeharto’s former trusted businessmen, Mohammad 
“Bob” Hasan, was also convicted of corruption, and the court found 
him guilty of stealing US$75 million of the government’s forestry funds 
in February 2001. The MA rejected Bob Hasan’s appeal in July 2001, 
and he was sentenced to six years in prison and demanded to return 
around US$24 million of state loss and pay a fine of Rp 15 million 
(Kompas 2001b).
Intervention in the Law Enforcement Institutions
At the outset, Gus Dur’s addressing of the law enforcement institutions 
appeared promising, when he issued a decree to separate the police 
from Indonesia’s military in July 2000 and place them directly under 
the president (Presidential Decision Decree number 89 2000 on the 
Position of Indonesia’s National Police). The president stated that this 
decree was an interim step toward the revision of the National Police 
Law in 1997 (Kompas 2000c).
Meanwhile, aware of the notorious corruption of the Indonesian 
Supreme Court (MA), Gus Dur intended to replace most of the Su-
preme judges as they retired by displaying his preference for Benjamin 
Mangkoedilaga, an MA judge, who was famous for his decision (against 
Soeharto’s will) about lifting the ban from Tempo Magazine in the 
administrative court [PTUN] in 1995 (Kompas 2000a). As a result of 
Gus Dur’s rift with political party leaders by the end of 2000, both the 
parliament and the MA united to oppose the appointment of Mang-
koedilaga. 
In the fit-and-proper test in the People’s Representative Council (In-
donesian: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), Mangkoedilaga failed to be 
nominated as Chief of MA. Instead, the DPR, led by Akbar Tandjung 
(chair of Golkar), managed to nominate two candidates as MA Chief, 
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namely, former Minister of Justice Muladi and former Director General 
of Minister of Justice Bagir Manan, in December 2000. Mangkoedilaga 
only passed the parliament’s fit-and-proper test as an MA member. After 
more than six months to avoid further marginalization from the DPR, 
Gus Dur installed Bagir Manan as Chief of MA in May 2001 (Jakarta 
Post 2001).
Furthermore, under Gus Dur, efforts were made to clean the judi-
ciary with the establishment of the Joint Team for Corruption Eradica-
tion (TGPTPK) in April 2000 as an interim team until the Corruption 
Eradication Commission was established, comprising law enforcement 
officers (the AGO and the Police) and elements from civil society (Gov-
ernment Regulation number 19/ 2000 on The Joint Team to Eradicate 
Corruption (TGPTPK )). The TGPTPK was led by former career MA 
judge Adi Andojo. The TPGPTPK also had vast authority because they 
could tap conversations during investigations and request the freezing 
of suspicious bank accounts (Government Regulation number 19/ 2000 
on The Joint Team to Eradicate Corruption (TGPTPK )).
Although the leadership composition of the TGPTPK looked prom-
ising, in the end, their performance was disappointing. The TGPTPK 
depended on public reports for their investigations, and they focused 
on cleaning up the judicial system (Chandra Hamzah, personal com-
munication, September 4, 2012). The litmus test came when a lawyer 
named Endin Wahyudin reported three MA judges to the TGPTPK for 
receiving bribes of Rp 96 million–100 million (Kompas 2001c).
However, the two MA judges then reported Endin for defamation 
to the police, possibly to deter further reports by other lawyers. The 
two MA judges requested a pre-trial in a West Jakarta court that was 
known for its past controversial rulings, which approved the request on 
the ground that the Tim Tindak Pidana Korupsi had been established 
through Law 31/1999 on corruption; therefore, they did not have the 
authority to investigate corruption cases related to the period before 
the law was enacted. The case that Endin reported had transpired in 
October–December 1998 (Kompas 2001c).
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Moreover, the lawyer of Harahap, one of the MA judges who filed 
a defamation suit, submitted a judicial review on Government Regula-
tion number 19/ 2000, the legal basis for the TGPTPK. As predicted, 
a panel of MA judges annulled the regulations in March 2001, thereby 
dissolving the TGPTPK. In the end, the TGPTPK was officially dis-
solved by Attorney General M.A. Rachman in August 2001 (Kompas 
2001a). The formation of the TGPTPK by Gus Dur was actually his 
boldest initiative in addressing corruption in Indonesia, but it was dis-
solved due to resistance from the judiciary apparatus.
Gus Dur compounded the problem through perception of his fre-
quent interference in law enforcement institutions. After his request 
for the arrest of Tommy Soeharto was ignored, in September 2000, he 
replaced Rusdihardjo with Gen. Bimantoro. However, Gus Dur con-
flicted further with Gen. Bimantoro and demanded Bimantoro’s resig-
nation as Chief of Police in June 2001 due to public pressure.
Nevertheless, Bimantoro refused the dismissal (Kompas 2001d). Gus 
Dur then went further by appointing Insp. Gen. Chaeruddin as Vice 
Chief of police and letting him take over the daily command. Chaerud-
din was unable to assert his authority over the police due to the signifi-
cant internal resistance toward the increasingly unpopular president.
Another case of Gus Dur personalizing the law enforcement process 
was when he aimed to replace BI Governor Syahril Sabirin. After Sabi-
rin refused to resign as BI governor, the AGO announced in June 2000 
that Sabirin was a suspect in the Bank Bali case. Sabirini’s detention 
sparked protests from Speaker of the Parliament Akbar Tandjung and 
other BI Deputy Governors. The AGO released Sabirin in December 
2000 after his maximum detention period had expired (Jakarta Post 
2000d). The Bimantoro and Sabirin cases truly undermined Gus Dur’s 
government legitimacy, which was essential in pushing further gover-
nance reform and anti-corruption effort.
Amid the turmoil, there was scant hope of addressing corruption 
until the cabinet reshuffle in June 2001, when Gus Dur managed to 
appoint the respected Marsilam Simanjuntak as Minister of Justice and 
Baharuddin Lopa as Attorney General. On being appointed Attorney 
139ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK
General, Lopa vowed to re-open the case on Indonesia’s Central Bank’s 
Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) that implicated major conglomerates and 
reexamine a case that implicated textile conglomerate Marimutu Sini-
vasan who had previously been protected by Gus Dur. Sinivasan was 
banned by Lopa from leaving the country as his company Texmaco was 
allegedly responsible for a state loss of Rp 19.8 trillion (Tempo 2001a).
 Lopa continued the investigation that implicated Speaker of Parlia-
ment Akbar Tandjung and Member of Parliament Nurdin Halid, both 
Golkar leaders, in the misuse of BULOG’s non-budgetary funds (Tempo 
2001b). Therefore, Gus Dur was accused of politicizing the corruption 
cases and using Lopa as his proxy. Unfortunately, in July 2001, Lopa 
suddenly passed away due to a heart attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and 
he was succeeded by Marsillam Simanjuntak. However, Marsillam was 
unable to achieve very much as Attorney General because Gus Dur’s 
mandate as president was revoked by the MPR at the end of July 2001.
Although Gus Dur targeted allegedly corrupt high state officials in 
the New Order era, according to Lanty, the timing of this action was a 
response to the MPR proceedings on Gus Dur’s impeachment (Lanti 
2002, 114). Thus, the prosecution process was regarded as a political 
vendetta. Mietzner argued that Gus Dur’s apparent interference in the 
legal process led to the loss of his government’s credibility with regard 
to implementing legal reform (Mietzner 2001, 38).
Arief Budiman noted that Gus Dur had inherited a quite appalling 
socio-political and economic legacy that would have presented ma-
jor challenges, irrespective of who was president. Although Budiman 
admitted Gus Dur’s leadership shortcomings also contributed to the 
problem (Budiman 2001, 57). Greg Barton (2002, 381–5) also argues 
that the post-Soeharto period was not conducive for Gus Dur to govern 
effectively due to a self-serving and corrupt state apparatus, the absence 
of functioning legal system, and an antagonistic military.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, despite the challenging circumstances 
inherited by his predecessor, when Gus Dur was elected President by 
the MPR with strong political capital, he had a significant opportu-
nity to bring about considerable reform and accelerate anti-corruption 
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drive. Unfortunately, both the challenging political environment and 
his counterproductive governance style not only cost him the presidency 
but also robbed him from the rare opportunity to execute important 
governance reform initiatives, such as judiciary reform, and progres-
sive anti-corruption measures. As a result, Gus Dur’s presidency ended 
up emboldening the conservative elites and oligarchs, who were able 
to hinder, stall, and reverse some of the previous governance reform 
progress made.
CONCLUSION
It was evident that there were high hopes that the duumvirate Gus 
Dur and Megawati, when appointed by the MPR, would bring a break-
through in the context of governance reform and anti-corruption mea-
sures. However, their partnership eventually fell apart. This was due to 
the unpredictable leadership of Gus Dur that resulted in his political 
isolation from almost all of his political allies, particularly in the DPR. 
This challenging circumstance convinced Megawati to withdraw sup-
port to Gus Dur, which was a significant political setback to Gus Dur’s 
government.  Consequently, despite the promising start in the military 
reform and judiciary reform, most of the reform progress made in the 
beginning was almost completely degenerated due to Gus Dur’s politi-
cal miscalculations, despite his initial good intentions.  As a result, the 
governance reform and anti-corruption agenda in 1999–2001 were, un-
fortunately sidelined by a traditional intra-elite political rivalry that be-
came a template and pattern of his successor during the post-Soeharto 
presidency. Perhaps, the case of Indonesia has provided a good case of 
the failure of fighting corruption that the success of toppling the old 
regime, reform agenda and high hopes are not enough in executing the 
best practice of the new governing. It is the failure of the elites to show 
effective leadership and unity that has put Indonesia in the prolonged 
fight to stem corruption.
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